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The political process between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party is entering a phase different from previous ones; the issue is no longer tied to declarations of intent or political calls, but has become linked to the parties’ ability to implement their commitments on the ground. On August 10, 2026, the Turkish parliament passed a law providing a legal framework for disarmament and the reintegration of some members of the party, following official verification of the organization’s dissolution and the surrender of its weapons. The law was approved by 468 deputies, marking an important legislative step along the path to ending the conflict.
With the law entering into force in August, the process moved to the phase of establishing mechanisms for implementation and verifying the handover of weapons and the termination of armed organizational activity. However, procedures have not progressed as quickly as some parties expected; in September, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan called on the Workers’ Party to accelerate disarmament steps, while leaders in the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party spoke in October about the imminent conclusion of the first phase and the anticipation of a report from the Turkish National Security Council to transition to the next phase.
According to the proposed concepts, the upcoming phase relates to the return of fighters to civilian life, addressing the status of leaders and members residing abroad, and preparing the legal and political conditions for participation in public life. Yet, differing interpretations regarding the sequence of commitments, the nature of the required guarantees, and the stance of Turkish institutions make the process vulnerable to stumbling at any time. Hence, the fundamental question emerges: Is Turkey heading toward a political settlement that reshapes its relationship with the Kurdish society, or does the primary goal remain ending the party’s armed presence and closing the security file?
From Disarmament to the Reorganization of the Political Landscape
The importance of the current phase lies not only in the number of weapons that can be handed over or the military sites that will be evacuated, but also in the nature of the transformation intended to be brought about within the structure of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. The return of thousands of fighters, if realized, will not be merely a security procedure, but will open a broad file concerning the future of these individuals, their legal and social status, and the possibility of their transition from organizational and military work to political and civilian participation.
In contrast, the Turkish government faces an equally significant test, as the success of the disarmament process requires more than declaring the end of armed activity. There are leaders, members, and political and media institutions associated with the party—some of whom live outside Turkey—whose situations cannot all be addressed through security measures alone. Furthermore, the return requires clear legal guarantees that define rights and obligations and prevent it from turning into a new phase of prosecution and turmoil.
The issue of timing and the commitments of both parties comes to the fore here. Ankara stipulates the verification of completed disarmament before applying legal facilities, while Kurdish political figures believe that reforms and guarantees should proceed in parallel with security steps. This divergence has appeared in the statements of the parties over recent months, especially with the persistence of disagreement over the extent of actual progress in implementing the process. Consequently, the true test is not merely ending the military presence of the party, but the ability to translate this transition into a stable political reality.
Öcalan between Charisma and Political Function
The ongoing transformations cannot be understood without pausing at the persona of Abdullah Öcalan, not only as the founder and historical leader of the party, but as one of the essential elements upon which the current process relies. Despite his imprisonment since 1999, his persona still retains symbolic and organizational influence within segments of the Kurdish movement, which appeared clearly when he called for ending the armed struggle and dissolving the party—a call that formed the basis for the subsequent transformation.
Yet the striking development is the shift in discourse from utilizing Öcalan’s symbolic standing to demanding that he be granted a direct role in managing the transition process. Here, an issue arises that transcends the conditions of his imprisonment and communications; it concerns his position in the upcoming phase and whether he will remain a moral reference for the movement or acquire a political role allowing him to participate in guiding its course.
There is a question worthy of reflection: Was Öcalan’s charisma the factor that made the party’s leadership and ranks accept the transition from weapons to politics, or did the concerned parties find in his historical status a means to convince the movement to accept a transformation that is difficult to pass through other means? The impact of his persona cannot be ignored, but employing this standing to make the settlement succeed does not necessarily mean recognizing him for a political role commensurate with the scale of his influence.
The paradox is that the Turkish state may need Öcalan’s symbolism to end the party’s armed structure, but it has not yet finalized the nature of the role he can play in the subsequent political phase. Therefore, the future of the process will not depend solely on his ability to convince the movement to lay down arms, but on Ankara’s readiness to move from benefiting from his symbolism to addressing his status and role within a broader settlement.
Ankara’s Calculations and the Limits of Political Settlement
Ankara is dealing with the current phase as an opportunity to end one of the most complex security and political files, but its calculations are inseparable from internal considerations that go beyond the issue of disarmament. The Turkish government seeks to stabilize security in the southern and southeastern regions, end the armed presence of the Workers’ Party, and readdress the Kurdish file within the state’s political and legal institutions.
The process is also tied to the calculations of the ruling coalition, notably the relationship between the Justice and Development Party and its ally the Nationalist Movement Party, in addition to the position of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party in the parliamentary equation. The settlement could open the door to broader political understandings, but at the same time, it raises questions about the nature of the reforms Ankara might accept and its readiness to expand Kurdish political participation.
However, the fundamental question relates to the limits of the Turkish state’s readiness to transition from a security settlement to a political settlement. The law passed by parliament provides a framework for addressing the situations of some former fighters, but by itself it does not offer a comprehensive solution to demands related to linguistic and cultural rights, the revision of counter-terrorism laws, or the guarantee of political participation free from restrictions and prosecutions.
Here, a divergence appears in the interpretation of the process’s objectives; while the Turkish government presents it as a step to end the armed threat and strengthen state unity, Kurdish political forces view it as an entry point that should lead to broader democratic reforms. The report of the Turkish parliamentary committee pointed to issues concerning freedoms and legal reform, but translating recommendations into practical procedures remains the most critical test. Hence, Ankara’s success in ending the party’s armed structure does not necessarily mean it has politically ended the Kurdish issue. A sustainable settlement requires a new relationship between the state and its Kurdish citizens, based on legal equality and the recognition of cultural and political pluralism, rather than simply removing the military factor from the equation.
Kurdish and Regional Extensions and the Future of the Process
The outcomes of the ongoing transformation cannot be confined within Turkey’s borders; the Kurdish issue is geographically and politically linked to four countries, involving the overlapping interests of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. Therefore, the success of the disarmament process and the reorganization of the Workers’ Party’s status will have repercussions on border regions and the nature of relations between Ankara and the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, as well as the future of Kurdish forces in Syria.
Iraqi Kurdistan represents an important arena in this equation, not only because of the presence of the party’s former sites and camps in its mountainous regions, but also due to its political, economic, and security relations with Turkey and Baghdad. The success of the process may open the way to reducing border tensions and enhancing economic and security cooperation, but it places Iraqi Kurdish parties before the necessity of handling the new transformations cautiously, lest the Turkish settlement become an additional source of competition and division within the Kurdish house.
As for Syria, it cannot be assumed that the dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party will automatically lead to resolving the status of the Syrian Democratic Forces or ending the disputes between Ankara and the Kurdish Autonomous Administration. Each arena has its own political and military circumstances and distinct institutions, despite the existence of organizational and intellectual ties among some of their components. Therefore, any handling of the Syrian file requires independent arrangements concerning the future of local administration, security guarantees, and the participation of various components in the Syrian state.
In this context, Iran should not be overlooked, as it monitors transformations in regional Kurdish balances due to their potential repercussions on its internal conditions and relations with neighboring countries. Thus, the Turkish settlement becomes part of a broader regional landscape where security interests intersect with political and economic calculations. Its success or stumbling will not remain confined to the relationship between Ankara and the Workers’ Party, but may affect the nature of Kurdish and regional balances in the coming years.
Peace Beyond Disarmament
Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party face a test that goes beyond ending the armed conflict; the real challenge lies not in surrendering weapons and evacuating military sites, but in the ability to build a political settlement that addresses the roots of the dispute and opens the way for a new phase of relations between the state and Kurdish society. Abdullah Öcalan’s charisma may be an important factor in crossing the first phase, but the continuation of the process cannot depend on a single individual, regardless of their historical standing; rather, it requires institutions, mutual guarantees, and clear political will.
Ending the armed conflict may open a historical window for Turkey and the Kurdish political movement, but it will not be the end of the Kurdish issue, rather the beginning of a new test for how it is approached. True peace is not measured by the weapons parties abandon, but by the trust, rights, and institutions they are able to build to ensure a return to conflict does not happen.
Note: This text is translated from the original Arabic version… Read the Arabic version:Click here
