Dr. Mahmoud Abbas
The government of al-Jolani appears to be moving along a path of internal erosion, even if the surface of the scene suggests that it still holds the reins of power firmly. The President of the Donald Trump, who offered direct support to Ahmad al-Sharaa after he shed the cloak of “al-Jolani,” did not do so as part of a long-term strategic endorsement, but rather as a temporary functional choice. Anyone reading Trump’s latest speech and the statements issued by his administration can clearly see that this support is not an open-ended authorization but a conditional mandate. A man installed through a political decision can be removed through the same mechanism if his mission ends or if his continued presence conflicts with the interests of those who supported him.
Regardless of the formal transformation in Ahmad al-Sharaa’s persona, the Syrian transitional government has, in the view of a wide segment of observers, entered a phase of structural fragility that precedes any external test. Internal fractures have become more dangerous than the possibility of regional confrontation. Multiple centers of decision-making, conflicting loyalties, and the absence of cohesion within the ruling bloc all indicate that the battle for survival will not be decided in geopolitical arenas but within the deep structure of the system itself. International pressures may alter the form of the system, but they will not remove the man unless internal conditions mature or broader external agreements emerge beyond an individual decision in the White House.
The support Ahmad al-Sharaa receives from Trump lacks a clear institutional cover from the United States Congress, which makes it closer to a circumstantial investment than to a strategic commitment. In its pragmatic approach, Washington does not support individuals as much as it supports a governing authority capable of performing a function within a potential regional security architecture, particularly in the context of tensions with Iran and its allied networks. In the event of any major shift in the balance of power, it would be easy to promote the narrative that the American administration “placed the man in his position” to carry out a specific mission and that the phase ended once the need for him ended.
Yet the most dangerous factor is not external but internal. The path that reduced tensions with certain Syrian components—especially after the agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces—did not end the crisis but rather transferred it into the ruling house itself. Political Islam, when it moves from the logic of preaching or combat to the logic of governance, opens the door to a hidden struggle over legitimacy: who has the greater right to implement Sharia? Who holds the right to leadership? Who represents the “saved sect”? Here begins the battle to rearrange the internal house once the battles of external balances subside.
The matter is no longer limited to political or military opponents. Voices have begun to emerge from within the supportive environment itself expressing discontent under the banner of “freedom of criticism” and the need to correct the course. These shifts, even if they appear partial, reflect the beginning of fractures within the social base that originally served as the primary lever of authority.
At the institutional level, the formation of the parliament has not yet been completed, leaving the legislative authority effectively suspended, as if governance remains caught between the logic of emergency rule and the logic of the state. The executive authority has not crystallized into a modern state apparatus but has remained closer to the organizational methodology that prevailed in the administration of Idlib, where a closed, movement-style character dominates institutional work. Over the course of a full year, no clear regularity of comprehensive ministerial meetings has appeared in which public policies are managed through transparent mechanisms, deepening the impression that the transition from a phase of control to a phase of state-building has not yet been completed.
In this context, the Ministry of Awqaf appears to be advancing to play a role that exceeds its traditional mandate, transforming into a parallel sovereign moral authority that rises in influence after Ahmad al-Sharaa and Asaad al-Shaibani. This overlap between the religious and the political, instead of being constitutionally resolved, reproduces the model of a “governing authority” rather than that of an inclusive state. Structurally, it resembles the experience of Wilayat al-Faqih in Iran, where religious authority stands above institutional authority.
The fragmentation does not stop at the relationship between religious and civil currents; it extends within the Wahhabi current itself, between hardline readings based on the interpretations of Ibn Taymiyyah and others inclined toward an imposed political pragmatism. This dispute is not merely a jurisprudential divergence but a profound conflict over the definition of the state: is it a closed ideological entity deriving its legitimacy from rigid texts, or a civil social contract capable of development and revision?
From the moment armed action was transformed into a governing project, authority entered a different test. Governance is not the continuation of battle through administrative tools; it is a transition to the logic of the state—institutions, law, representation, management of differences, and the building of trust. Here the structural gap between the logic of the organization and the logic of the state becomes evident—one of the fractures and disasters of political Islam. An organization is based on obedience, ideological discipline, and closed hierarchy, whereas the state is built on plurality and the management of contradictions within a comprehensive legal framework. When this gap is not resolved, the crisis does not explode all at once; rather, the symptoms of silent erosion begin to appear deep within the governing structure.
In its external discourse and in the management of certain facilities, crossings, and services, the transitional government attempts to present itself as a responsible authority capable of obtaining international recognition. Yet this path coexists with a parallel reality in which doctrinal jurists dominate decision-making circles, and the governing mentality is built upon the concept of an “ideological army” rather than an inclusive national doctrine. The result is a closed power structure that reproduces a new totalitarian model. It may differ from the Baath system in its references and slogans, but it resembles it in centralization, insularity, and the monopolization of decision-making.
Here the decisive structural contradiction becomes clear: a modern state in form, but the mind of an extremist Islamist organization in essence. Unless this contradiction is resolved through genuine constitutional and institutional reform—one that separates religion from the state and abolishes the sovereignty of jurisprudence—it will remain the most effective factor in eroding the experiment from within, before external equations bring it down or the will of allies replaces it.
United States of America
21 February 2026
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