By: Shervan Seifeddine
The Kurdish people are considered one of the largest ethnic groups in the world without a state framework. This remains true despite the historical imprint of the Kurds in the region and their ancestors’ possession of civilizations and a Kurdish empire—achievements realized at the expense of others and subsequently lost to others, following the cosmic cycle based on this philosophy. Moving away from the distant past, and following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire—the last of the Islamic caliphates—its legacy was partitioned into modern states and nationalities based on a contemporary distribution of regional geopolitics. This was engineered by the victorious Allied powers of World War I, led by Britain and France, in what became known as the Sykes-Picot division of the region’s geography, and was solidified through subsequent agreements and treaties, reaching a finality at Lausanne and being ratified in international forums.
The Kurdish people are perhaps the weakest link in all the aforementioned history, especially if we consider the fragmentation, division, and “micro-privatization” that focused on narrow personal interests at the expense of both the history and the future of the region. Naturally, the Kurdish people were never satisfied with this partition. Consequently, successive Kurdish revolutions followed, led by figures dictated by availability and the exigencies of the time. However, due to objective and subjective circumstances, these movements did not always align with the requirements of their era, given the pre-existing international interests and alliances built on a utilitarian basis for each party’s goals.
The Emergence of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
Kurdish revolutions between the two World Wars were characterized by their traditional nature, relying primarily on tribal chiefs (Aghas), sheikhs, and religious figures, and were naturally confined to narrow geographical areas based on what was possible at the time. However, after World War II, direct contact with global Communism and Socialism—represented by the Soviet Union—increased. Kurdish youth began flocking to Eastern European countries due to the ease of travel and direct interaction with those societies, transplanting those ideas into Kurdish communities, which are naturally adaptable to the new. The Kurdish people are known for their openness and lack of religious or sectarian fanaticism, and they embraced these ideas for the “glimmer” they reflected upon the social condition, particularly the Kurdish one.
By the early 1970s, Kurdish youth became involved in this new trend that moved away from religion and theology. Kurds in Northern Kurdistan (Turkey) were among the first to join this global internationalist leftist current. Less than a decade later, this young group attempted to operate independently, integrating national character and Kurdish specificity with internationalism in an attempt to create a new model. The launch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in 1978 was a qualitative leap in the history of Kurdish liberation movements—an unconventional start led by a young leadership known as “The Students.” This unprecedented youthful enthusiasm led shortly thereafter to the launch of armed struggle in 1984, which became a radical and pivotal turning point in the history of modern Turkey. Turkey considers itself the legitimate heir to the Ottoman Empire, despite being a state that emerged from it like any other, if we exclude the geographical factor of Istanbul from which the empire was managed. No one can deny the impact of the PKK on the Kurds of Turkey specifically, and Kurds elsewhere generally, through the national and internationalist discourse it presented. It created a state of balance and proved itself through direct contact with other revolutionary movements in the region, embracing internationalist revolutionaries within its ranks and promoting them to leadership positions far removed from narrow nationalism or nepotism.
A turning point in the early 1990s was the Turkish recognition of the Kurdish cause. Former Turkish President Turgut Özal was among the first to officially acknowledge the Kurdish presence in Turkey and their cultural, social, and linguistic rights. However, this recognition acted as a “liquidation bullet” for him personally. Subsequently, the arena of Northern Kurdistan witnessed a state of tension between successive Turkish governments and the PKK, which resulted in the capture of the party leader, Mr. Abdullah Öcalan, in February 1999. This was followed by setbacks for the party, perhaps the most significant being the leadership confusion between 2002 and 2004—the date the party relaunched with new leadership under the ideology of its sole leader, without any conditions.
The Revolutionary State: Between Dictatorship and Democracy, or the Dictatorship of the Revolution
Mr. Abdullah Öcalan perhaps reached a practical reality during his study of the history of global liberation revolutions and those resisting occupiers in the world generally, and the Middle East specifically. The first conclusion was the creation of a “Single Leader” and the elimination of any role for a “Second-in-Command.” For instance, in one of his interviews with journalist Nabil Milhem, he divests himself of the role of the “First Man” and refuses numerical classification. He justifies this by stating that the existence of a “First Man” necessarily leads to the creation of a “Second Man,” whose goal will be to become the first, and so on. Thus, he justifies the state of “Revolutionary Dictatorship” as a necessary transitional phase to maintain the glow of the revolution rather than fragmenting it, which would dilute its noble ideas. Consequently, we can say we are facing a Stalinist model of leadership: the strong individual around whom the revolution and revolutionaries revolve.
Mr. Öcalan started with the slogan of “Liberating and Unifying Kurdistan” at a time when this was a prominent revolutionary slogan worldwide—creating a state and institutions based on the European or British national model. However, after three years in prison and reading specific literature, the compass shifted toward a “Second Manifesto” under the name of “Democratic Society” or the “Democratic Nation.” His movement adopted this after its post-2004 restructuring. Work began on printing and promoting this concept, especially following the strengthening of the European Union and the launch of the common currency at the start of the current millennium, which served as additional proof of the necessity and health of this concept for coexistence between nations and peoples. This was further bolstered by rapid technological development and leaps in communication that turned the world into a “small room” where ideas are easily exchanged.
Accelerated Geopolitical Changes After 2020
Although the “Arab Spring” revolutions began only a decade into the current millennium, they did not meet the expectations of the dominant West and failed to modernize as required. They did not move beyond overthrowing leaders and replacing them with others who were more ideologically or religiously dogmatic. Perhaps the year 2020—the “Year of Corona” when the world stopped moving—was a pivotal year for unfreezing global political and economic files. The American withdrawal from Afghanistan was one of the most prominent leaps, followed by the Russia-Ukraine war, then the events of October 7th and its repercussions between Israel and Hamas, and Iran’s regional proxies from Hezbollah to the Syrian regime, leading up to the twelve-day conflict between Israel and Iran in July of last year, and what is currently unfolding.
All of the above had a direct impact on the Kurdish situation in the region. Naturally, the PKK plays a pivotal role in several parts of Kurdistan. Consequently, Rojava (Western Kurdistan) became part of political “bazaars” to return it to the Syrian fold, as it is said, in exchange for concessions in the South and Northwest. Thus, party supporters and the Kurdish movement in general, along with the Kurdish people, were put under their most difficult test during the first two months of the current year. In February of last year, Mr. Abdullah Öcalan launched the “Third Peace Initiative” with Turkey and general reconciliation for Kurds within the countries they live in—a step that created much controversy regarding Turkey’s acceptance. Although the leader of the Turkish Nationalist Movement (MHP), considered the most extremist regarding the Kurdish issue, adopted it and personally vowed to make it succeed, the steps taken by the Turkish state do not compare to those of the PKK, which symbolically “disbanded” itself and “burned its weapons” to end the armed conflict and sit at the political table.
What remains misunderstood is the cautious American rapprochement with this movement through its supporters in Syria, who have been allies for over a decade within the International Coalition to fight ISIS. This caution can be summarized in several points:
America seeks Kurds who think like it, not its antithesis.
America views this movement as having a leftist, communist, and socialist internationalist background—ideas that do not align with its own.
America seeks allies in the region, like the Gulf Arabs, to serve as financial funds or soldiers on demand.
America does not favor any “dissenting voice” outside the American strategy; thus, it prefers creating subordinates rather than taming existing ones.
America always views partnership based on dependency, while the PKK wants partnership based on parity (equality).
Based on the above, the United States is trying to win over the party and benefit from it as much as possible to achieve its interests. Meanwhile, the party is caught between the jaws of a pincer: on one side, the states occupying Kurdistan show no serious or genuine intentions to solve the Kurdish dilemma; on the other side, great international powers try to turn them into pawns without any moral or humanitarian consideration for the rights of peoples to self-determination.
Between “Revolutionary Dogmatism” (the principles upon which the movement was founded) and “Political Pragmatism” (which must be observed according to the interests of the great powers steering the world), the PKK is trying to create a kind of flexible balance. Certainly, the party’s leadership is not lacking in experience or cunning, but the most prominent obstacle it faces is placing all its decisions in the basket of its leader, who has been imprisoned for more than twenty-seven years under mysterious circumstances regarding his health, amid conflicting statements between official diplomatic meetings and family visits.
Read the Arabic version: Click here
