The leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Devlet Bahçeli, has brought up his well-known project, known as the 100 provinces and 1,000 districts project, on November 1, 2026. Turkey currently comprises 81 provinces and 957 districts, and the project proposes adding 19 new provinces and 78 new districts to raise the total to 100 provinces and 1,000 districts.
The project is not new in its origin; it was first proposed in 2023 on the occasion of the centenary of the founding of the Turkish Republic. However, reintroducing it at this specific timing carries three political dimensions that go beyond the declared administrative reform.
First, the Kurdish dimension, which is the most important dimension. When looking at the list of cities nominated to become provinces, we find that they include Cizre in Şırnak, Yüksekova in Hakkâri, Midyat in Mardin, Ergani in Diyarbakır, Kahta in Adıyaman, Elbistan in Maraş, Siverek in Urfa, and İskenderun in Hatay. Most of these are Kurdish regions or regions mixed with Kurds and Alevis.
Transforming these districts into provinces practically means dividing major Kurdish provinces such as Amed/Diyarbakır, Mardin, Şırnak, and Hakkâri, so that no single cohesive Kurdish geographical and demographic bloc remains. Furthermore, each new province means the appointment of a new governor by Ankara, a new police chief, and a budget directly tied to the center, which increases the grip of the central state instead of moving toward genuine decentralization. Electorally, it redraws the map of seats and constituencies in a way that serves the balances desired by the authorities.
Second, the dimension of the Century of Turkey and the presidential system. Bahçeli has made it clear that his project falls within an administrative vision for the Century of Turkey following the transition to the presidential system in 2017. The state believes that the old administrative structure is no longer capable of absorbing population growth, urban expansion, and internal migration, and therefore it seeks to build a stronger centralized state but with more widespread administrative arms and a greater capacity for control.
Third, the issue of timing and why now. A week before Bahçeli’s statement, a presidential decree was issued restructuring the Ministry of Interior and establishing 112 emergency directorates in all 81 provinces, meaning the legal and institutional infrastructure is ready for implementation. Additionally, Turkey is undergoing a new peace process with the Kurds following the call of the Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan and the process of dissolving the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Hence, the state is keen to consolidate its administrative and security presence in Bakur/the Southeast before entering into any serious discussion regarding decentralization, cultural rights, and other Kurdish national rights.
We can also add to the above that the project may carry a clear electoral message. Bahçeli is courting large districts such as Alanya, whose population exceeds 359,000, as well as Bandırma, Fethiye, and others, by promising to turn them into provinces—a promise that carries direct electoral gains.
In conclusion, what is taking place is not merely an administrative redistribution to facilitate services as claimed, but rather a geographical and political re-engineering of Turkey aimed at dismantling Kurdish concentration, strengthening Ankara’s grip, and distributing electoral gains under the guise of administrative modernization. Some might go as far as to say that with this approach, Ankara is initiating the second phase of the Eastern Reform Project, the first phase of which was launched by Mustafa Kemal about a hundred years ago, without overlooking the implications of transferring Öcalan as a political coordinator. In other words, despite the aforementioned, it appears to be: step for step.
Note: This text is translated from the original Arabic version… Read the Arabic version:Click here
