I have often wondered why a person finds themselves forced to justify their right to a dignified life, as if justice requires political approval, or as if belonging to the homeland is incomplete without the satisfaction of authority. Rights are not born in government offices, nor are they forfeited by changes in the balance of power; rather, they derive their legitimacy from the humanity of their holders, and constitutions exist to protect them. From this perspective, I understand the cause of the Kurds in Iraq: a people who did not ask for a privilege at the expense of others, but rather wanted to live with dignity and identity, as partners in a homeland they helped build and paid heavy prices for its stability.
The Kurdistan Parliament was not born by a decision from Baghdad, nor were the region’s institutions a political favor. They were preceded by decades of liberation movements, Anfal, Halabja, and displacement, leading up to the Uprising of March 1991 and the elections of May 19, 1992, which produced the first elected parliament in Kurdistan. These institutions were built upon the sacrifices of a people who realized that protecting their existence begins with building their institutions, and that freedom not guarded by laws remains vulnerable to being lost.
After 2003, the Kurds did not stand on the margins of rebuilding Iraq; rather, they participated in establishing its new political system. Masoud Barzani and the Kurdistan leadership played a pivotal role in the understandings that accompanied the formation of successive governments, and in embedding federalism within the 2005 Constitution. Barzani’s stances formed an important political pillar during sensitive phases of Iraq’s history, making the reduction of the relationship between Baghdad and Erbil to a financial dispute a shortsighted reading of the history of partnership.
However, a question accompanies me whenever I follow officials’ statements and media coverage: Why have we Kurds become accustomed to justifying our rights? Why does the Kurdish official appear required to explain the reasons for adhering to the region’s share, its employees’ salaries, and the powers of its institutions, while the constitution is supposed to be the arbiter among all?
Let us return to the facts away from slogans. Article 117 recognized the Kurdistan Region and its existing authorities, Article 121 granted it clear constitutional powers, while Article 115 regulated the distribution of competencies between the federal authorities and the regions. As for Article 140, it set December 31, 2007, as the deadline to complete normalization, the census, and the referendum in Kirkuk and the disputed territories. Nearly nineteen years have passed since that constitutional deadline, and the file remains without a final settlement. If there are disputes regarding implementation mechanisms, is it permissible for postponement to become a permanent substitute for commitment?
In 2007 as well, the draft federal oil and gas law was proposed, but it did not become an enforceable law. Article 111 stipulates that oil and gas are owned by all Iraqis, while Article 112 regulates the joint management of fields covered by its provisions and the fair distribution of revenues. In the absence of federal legislation, disputes over contracts, production, and export accumulated, leading up to the Federal Court’s ruling in February 2022 regarding the region’s oil and gas law. The legal differences between the two sides cannot be denied, but their continuation throughout these years reveals a legislative and political failure to complete one of the most important foundations of the federal state.
Then came the budgets to reveal another flaw. The region’s share and its oil and non-oil obligations turned into repeated negotiations, during which Baghdad and Erbil exchanged accusations regarding revenues and transfers. According to the regional government’s data, its listed allocations between 2019 and 2025 reached approximately 146.4 trillion dinars, compared to transfers totaling 33.4 trillion. These are figures that require scrutiny into the nature of allocations, obligations, and settlements, but they raise a legitimate question about the gap between what was decided and what was implemented, and about the fate of financial rights that are supposed to remain unaffected by political friction.
As for the Peshmerga, whose organization falls within the powers of the region under Article 121, their funding, personnel salaries, and equipment have remained a subject of dispute, despite their role in confronting the ISIS organization since 2014. How can the rights of forces that contributed to protecting Iraq remain suspended on changing financial understandings, instead of being organized by a stable legal mechanism?
On October 9, 2020, Baghdad and Erbil reached the Sinjar Agreement to organize administration and security, prepare for the return of displaced persons, and facilitate reconstruction. However, essential aspects of it remained stalled, and security complexities and the presence of armed groups continued to hinder stability. The loss was not merely political; Yazidi families waiting to return to their homes paid the humanitarian price for the delayed implementation.
Since Masrour Barzani assumed the presidency of the regional government in July 2019, his government chose to continue negotiating to address the disputes. It demonstrated flexibility in the files of oil, revenues, and salaries, leading to export arrangements through SOMO and the resumption of oil pumping via Ceyhan in September 2025, following a halt that had continued since March 2023. Discussions also continued through 2026 regarding financial obligations and the 2027 budget. These steps do not mean the end of disputes or the execution of all obligations, but they confirm that the door to understanding has remained open.
The intention is not to exempt Erbil from accountability; Baghdad has the right to demand revenues and legal obligations, just as the region has the right to demand its constitutional entitlements. However, equality before the law, mandated by Article 14, requires that citizens’ salaries do not turn into a means of pressure, and that their rights do not become hostage to institutional disputes.
I believe that Masrour Barzani’s flexibility in negotiation does not contradict firmness regarding rights; rather, it reflects an awareness that partnership requires practical solutions. But flexibility alone cannot save agreements that lack implementation, nor can it build trust whose crises renew with every budget.
Here lies a responsibility on Kurdish media as well; instead of constantly preoccupying ourselves with justifying positions, we must present a documented record of what has been implemented and what has stalled, and who bears responsibility, without emotionalism or unconditional defense of any government.
The Kurds have contributed to building the new Iraq, drafting its constitution, and protecting its security, and they are not required to prove that in every dispute. What is required of Baghdad and Erbil is to respect the constitutional contract they agreed upon, because the strength of the state is measured by its ability to safeguard the rights of its citizens.
The rights safeguarded by sacrifices and recognized by the constitution are not a favor from anyone, and true partnership begins when fulfilling obligations becomes a duty that needs no justification.
Note: This text is translated from the original Arabic version… Read the Arabic version:Click here
