In the political history of the Kurdish people, there are milestones whose effects do not end with the conclusion of their events; they remain present in memory, returning whenever the Kurds find themselves facing a familiar equation: an alliance dictated by interests, sacrifices made on the ground, and then a shift in the calculations of major powers that places their future before difficult questions.
The year 1975 was one of the most painful of these milestones, when the September Revolution in Iraqi Kurdistan collapsed following the Algiers Agreement between Iraq and Iran, and the aid reaching the Kurdish movement through the Shah ceased. Nearly half a century later, the question has returned to the forefront with the transformations witnessed in Syria, the shift in the American stance toward the Syrian Democratic Forces, and the statements of the US Special Envoy to Syria, Tom Barrack, in January 2026, that the role of the SDF as the primary field force in the fight against ISIS “has largely ended.”
This comparison does not mean that history repeats itself verbatim; each stage has its own circumstances, parties, and balances. Yet it raises a question worthy of reflection: To what extent can the Kurdish people rely on international alliances whose continuity is determined by the strategic interests of major powers?
First: Kissinger in 1975 — When support stopped and its limits were exposed
In the early 1970s, the Kurdish issue entered the calculations of the Cold War. The United States, at the request of the Iranian Shah, began providing covert support to the Kurdish movement in Iraq, within the context of the conflict with the Baghdad regime and its relations with the Soviet Union. This support was not an independent American commitment to guarantee the national rights of the Kurds, but rather part of regional and international arrangements in which Iran played a pivotal role.
On March 6, 1975, Iraq and Iran signed the Algiers Agreement, which resolved border disputes between the two countries, particularly regarding the Shatt al-Arab, in exchange for Iranian concessions in negotiation files. Among its most prominent outcomes was that the Shah halted the financial and military aid that had been reaching the Kurds in Iraq.
An official US document dated June 4, 1975, reveals that the Central Intelligence Agency terminated the assistance program for the Kurds after the Shah halted support following the Algiers Agreement, and that the Kurdish resistance collapsed as a result, while its leaders were forced to seek asylum in Iran.
Thus, the Kurdish movement found itself facing the consequences of an agreement to which it was not a party, and over which it had neither the ability to prevent its conclusion nor the assurance that its interests would not be the first to be sacrificed upon its realization.
In the context of this experience, the phrase attributed to Henry Kissinger became famous: “Covert action should not be confused with missionary work.” It appeared in subsequent political accounts regarding the issue of Kurdish support, and was attributed to a senior American official in the context of investigations related to it. However, more important than the phrase itself is what the documents reveal: American support was not accompanied by an independent guarantee of its continuity if the calculations of the regional intermediary through whom the aid passed were to change.
The lesson was not that the Kurds erred simply because they dealt with an international power; nationalist movements, much like states, need to build external relations and benefit from intersecting interests. Rather, the tragedy lay in the imbalance of the relationship: one party holds the decision to halt support, and the other pays the military and human price when that support ceases.
From here, the experience of 1975 gained its place in Kurdish political memory; not as evidence of the impossibility of allying with the outside, but as a warning against turning alliance into the sole guarantee for the future.
Second: Tom Barrack — From partnership in the war against ISIS to the priority of integration
In 2014, with the expansion of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the Syrian Democratic Forces—whose backbone was formed by Kurdish fighters—emerged as a key field partner for the US-led international coalition in the war against the organization. The forces made significant human sacrifices during the years of fighting and contributed to ending ISIS’s territorial control across wide areas of Syria.
According to a toll announced by the Syrian Democratic Forces in March 2019, more than 11,000 of its fighters were killed during the war against the organization, and more than 21,000 were injured.
These sacrifices were not mere numbers in a military record; they were linked to the protection of cities and towns, and to confronting an organization that committed extensive crimes against the region’s inhabitants and its various components. In return, the United States provided military, intelligence, and logistical support to the SDF within the framework of a specific objective: defeating ISIS and preventing its return.
However, the nature of the partnership remained tied to this objective. It did not automatically transform into a permanent American commitment to guarantee an independent political future for the Kurds, to entrench the model of governance that emerged in the Autonomous Administration regions, or to protect all the gains of the SDF after the end of the primary phase of the war against the organization.
With the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the rise of a new authority in Damascus, Washington’s priorities began to shift. On January 20, 2026, Tom Barrack announced that the former role of the Syrian Democratic Forces as the primary field force in fighting ISIS “has largely ended,” noting that the Syrian government had become ready to assume security responsibilities previously undertaken by the SDF. He also spoke of an opportunity for the Kurds to integrate into the new Syrian state.
This statement reflects a clear shift in the American approach: instead of continued reliance on the SDF as the primary field partner, Washington has come to lean toward supporting the transfer of security responsibilities to Syrian state institutions, while pushing for the integration of existing forces and structures into state institutions.
Yet this shift opens up questions that go beyond military arrangements: What will happen to the national and political rights of the Kurds? And what guarantees prevent integration from leading to the marginalization of their distinct identity or the curtailing of their participation in the administration of their regions? Will the Kurds be treated as a partner in state-building, or will they be asked to integrate into institutions where they lack sufficient guarantees to influence their decisions?
These are questions that diplomatic statements alone cannot answer; their answers depend on the shape of the Syrian settlement, the content of the agreements, the mechanisms of their implementation, and the legal and political guarantees that will be adopted.
Third: Between the two experiences — What repeats, and what differs?
| Nature of Alliance | Secret support in the context of the Cold War | Field partnership in the war against ISIS |
| Intermediary | Iran (the Shah) | US-led international coalition |
| Reason for Cessation | Algiers Agreement and shifting calculations of the Shah | Shifting priorities after the fall of the Syrian regime |
| Immediate Consequence | Collapse of the September Revolution | Transition from military partnership to a push for integration |
| Guarantees | Absent | Not yet settled |
The comparison should not be based on the assertion that the two scenes are identical; there are fundamental differences between the two contexts. Yet three points of similarity deserve attention.
First: Strategic interests determine the nature of the alliance and its continuity.
In the 1970s, Washington’s interest in weakening Baghdad intersected with the Shah’s calculations. In Syria, American cooperation with the SDF was primarily tied to fighting ISIS. In both cases, support in itself was not a permanent guarantee for achieving Kurdish national goals. This does not mean that every alliance ends in betrayal, but rather that its continuity remains contingent upon the parties’ assessment of their interests, unless supported by clear arrangements and actionable guarantees.
Second: Military alliance does not necessarily equal recognition of political rights.
An international party may need a local force to achieve a military objective, but it does not necessarily commit to meeting its political demands after the mission ends. Therefore, a distinction must be made between recognition of the military role, political partnership, and legal guarantees for national rights. Sacrifices grant a strong moral and political argument, but they do not automatically transform into constitutional guarantees unless translated into agreements and institutions.
Third: Decisions made without active Kurdish participation may leave long-term impacts.
The experience of 1975 revealed the vulnerability of a movement relying on external support that its regional ally could cut off. In the Syrian case, the future of the Kurds remains tied to their ability to actively participate in shaping political and security arrangements, rather than contenting themselves with waiting for what other capitals decide.
Fourth: Decree No. 13 — An important step, but not the end of the road
On January 16, 2026, Syrian Presidential Decree No. 13 was issued, affirming that Kurdish citizens are an integral part of the Syrian people, recognizing the Kurdish language as a national language, permitting its teaching in schools in accordance with the provisions of the decree, canceling the exceptional measures resulting from the 1962 Al-Hasakah census, granting citizenship to citizens of Kurdish origin residing in Syria, including the unregistered, and declaring Nowruz an official paid holiday.
The importance of these steps should not be underestimated, particularly regarding addressing the consequences of deprivation of citizenship and recognizing language and cultural identity. They represent a significant legal transformation in the history of the relationship between the Syrian state and the Kurds.
However, the decree, regardless of its importance, does not alone settle the future of national and political rights. Sustainable rights require a clear constitutional framework, executive laws, independent institutions, mechanisms for accountability, and guarantees that protect them from regression when circumstances change.
Furthermore, recognizing the Kurdish language as a national language does not automatically equate to adopting it as an official language in state institutions, nor does it resolve issues of political participation, the form of local administration, or the distribution of powers. These are issues that must be discussed within the framework of a comprehensive constitutional settlement.
Hence, a responsible stance is not based on rejecting the decree because it does not fulfill all demands, nor on considering it the end of the issue; rather, it is based on dealing with it as a step upon which to build, while continuing to work toward broader and more stable guarantees.
Fifth: Integration or dissolution? The issue lies in guarantees
The call for the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces and the institutions of the Autonomous Administration into the Syrian state raises an issue that goes beyond terminology. Integration into the state is not necessarily a waiver of national identity, just as retaining separate structures does not alone guarantee the protection of rights.
The true criterion is the nature of the agreement governing this integration: Does it ensure Kurdish participation in state institutions? Does it preserve their cultural and linguistic rights? Does it clearly define the powers of local administration? Does it allow for fair representation in military and security institutions? And are there independent mechanisms to address disputes and monitor implementation?
If integration takes place according to a clear agreement that guarantees equality, participation, and rights, it could serve as a gateway to a more stable settlement. If it is limited to dissolving existing institutions and integrating individuals into centralized structures without adequate guarantees, the process may turn into a reproduction of marginalization, even if accompanied by rhetoric about national unity.
Therefore, it is not enough to tell the Kurds that they have an “opportunity” for integration, nor is it enough for them to reject every formula out of fear of losing their gains. What is required is serious political negotiation that defines rights, duties, and powers, and prevents core issues from becoming hostage to divergent interpretations or non-binding promises.
Sixth: Kurdish unity — A necessity that does not mean eliminating differences
Experiences show that internal division can weaken the negotiating capacity of nationalist movements, making them more vulnerable to the pressures of regional and international powers. The Kurdish movement has suffered at various junctures from political and organizational disputes that affected its ability to build a unified stance.
Yet it is a mistake to explain every Kurdish setback by division alone; the decisions of major powers, balances of power, regional conflicts, and military conditions are all factors influencing the course of events. The Algiers Agreement and the Shah’s decision to halt assistance were direct factors in the collapse of the September Revolution in 1975, according to US documents.
Nevertheless, unity of ranks remains an important factor in enhancing negotiating capacity, provided it does not turn into a slogan that conceals disagreements or imposes silence on criticism. National unity does not mean partisan conformity, but rather agreement on core issues and managing disagreements through responsible political means. Practically, this requires: formulating a Syrian Kurdish political contract that sets out the minimum shared demands, establishing a joint negotiation mechanism that defines who represents the Kurds and how they are held accountable, and opening the door for the participation of youth, women, intellectuals, and civil activists, rather than limiting it to a gathering of leaders.
Negotiating power is not measured by the number of slogans raised, but by society’s ability to produce a clear stance, representative institutions, and a vision capable of being defended before domestic and external parties.
Seventh: What should the Kurds learn from the two experiences?
The Kurdish people cannot be asked to dispense with international relations; the political world is based on interests, and communicating with influential powers is part of realistic political action. What can be drawn, however, is that external relations must not become a substitute for building internal strength. This requires four interconnected paths:
First: Building a common Kurdish stance. The requirement is not to eliminate party pluralism, but to formulate a minimum threshold of national and political demands, negotiate on their basis, and establish clear mechanisms to determine who represents these demands and how they are held accountable.
Second: Transforming rights into legal guarantees. Cultural, linguistic, and political rights must be part of the constitutional framework, accompanied by executive laws and institutions capable of protecting them, rather than remaining dependent on politically volatile understandings.
Third: Diversifying external relations without becoming beholden to any single party. This does not mean randomly moving between capitals or replacing one ally with another, but rather building relations based on mutual interests, clarity in objectives, and avoiding mortgaging the national decision to a single side.
Fourth: Linking any agreement to measurable outcomes. Agreements should not be evaluated through positive statements alone, but according to what they achieve in terms of security, rights, and political participation, the extent of commitment to implementing their provisions, and the existence of mechanisms to address violations.
These paths do not guarantee the prevention of every setback, nor do they eliminate power imbalances, but they reduce the vulnerability of the Kurdish position and provide it with better tools to deal with regional and international shifts.
Conclusion: From the memory of betrayal to the politics of balanced interests
The conditions of Iraq in 1975 differ from those of Syria in 2026, but the two experiences leave a shared question: What remains of an alliance when the interests that created it change?
In the first case, the aid reaching the Kurdish movement through Iran ended after the Algiers Agreement, leading to the collapse of the revolution and leaving the Kurds facing the consequences of a decision in whose formulation they did not participate. In the Syrian case, Tom Barrack’s statements reveal a shift in American priorities, with the focus shifting from military partnership with the SDF to supporting the assumption by the Syrian state of security responsibilities previously undertaken by the forces.
Neither case proves that every international alliance will necessarily end in abandoning the partner, nor that cooperation with major powers is wrong in itself. But they remind us that international interests are not static, and that sacrifices made by a people or a local force do not automatically transform into permanent political guarantees.
What is required is not for the Kurds to stop seeking allies, but for them to stop viewing alliances as a definitive guarantee for their future. An ally may help at one stage, and its priorities may change at another; whereas rights built on clear constitutional institutions, a common political stance, and indigenous negotiating capacity are more resilient in the face of transformations.
The memory of 1975 should not become a destiny governing the future, nor should its lessons be forgotten with every new alliance. History offers no ready-made recipe, but it reveals the cost of relying on arrangements whose continuity the Kurds cannot guarantee.
Therefore, what is required is not the search for an ally ungoverned by interests—for this is not the reality of international relations—but rather the construction of a cause whose people’s rights do not become hostage to the interests of allies alone.
That is the difference between waiting for someone to protect the future and working to possess the political and institutional tools that make rights protectable and negotiable. From here begins the most important step: that external relations be a support for the Kurdish stance, not a substitute for its will, and that any alliance be a means to achieve rights, not a sole guarantee for a people’s destiny.
Sources
US Central Intelligence Agency document, June 4, 1975 (Termination of the assistance program for the Kurds).
Adel Al-Jubouri, “American Abandonment of Friends Before Enemies”, Al-Sabah Newspaper, January 28, 2026.
Statement by Tom Barrack, US Special Envoy to Syria, January 20, 2026.
Announcement by the Syrian Democratic Forces regarding its casualties in the war against ISIS, March 2019.
Syrian Presidential Decree No. 13 of 2026.
Reports of the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) regarding Barrack’s statements, January 2026.
Shan Mohammed, “Kissinger’s Curse Codified: The 2026 Doctrine of Transactional Abandonment”, January 31, 2026.
Bernama-SANA, “US Envoy Barrack Hails Syria–SDF Agreement As Step Toward Unity And Lasting Stability”, 30 January 2026.
TASS, “US does not intend to maintain long-term military presence in Syria — envoy”, 20 January 2026.
Note: This text is translated from the original Arabic version… Read the Arabic version:Click here
