For decades, the United States has consistently handled the Kurdish issue within the framework of its strategic interests and regional priorities. On numerous occasions, these interests aligned with the aspirations of the Kurdish people, making military and political support present whenever necessity dictated. However, experience has proven that this intersection does not necessarily mean a permanent commitment to protecting Kurdish rights or guaranteeing their political future.
With every shift in the White House, whether the ruler is a Republican or a Democrat, the same question returns: Are the Kurds strategic partners of the United States, or allies imposed by circumstantial conditions whose importance diminishes when calculations change?
Perhaps historical experience offers an answer more complex than simply accusing one administration of abandonment or praising another. The problem is not solely related to the identity of the ruling party, but to the nature of American policy, which makes security interests and priorities a fundamental determinant of its relationships. From here, the Kurdish need emerges to transition from reliance on temporary alliances to building a political project based on rights, legitimacy, institutions, and constitutional and international guarantees.
First: The Republicans – From Safe Haven to Withdrawal from Syria
The Republican stance on the Kurdish issue cannot be understood without pausing at contrasting historical milestones that combined support in one phase with retreat in another.
In 1991, following the Kurdish uprising in Iraq and the subsequent humanitarian tragedy and widespread displacement, the administration of President George H.W. Bush launched Operation Provide Comfort and established a no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel within the framework of international arrangements that provided relative protection for the Kurdish population and contributed to creating conditions that allowed them to manage the affairs of their regions away from Baghdad’s authority.
Then came 2003, when the administration of George W. Bush led the American invasion of Iraq, which toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime and opened a new political phase that led to the drafting of the 2005 constitution, which approved the federal system and recognized the Kurdistan Region as a federal entity within the Iraqi state.
This was a historical gain for the Kurdish people in Iraq, but it was not a pure American gift; it was achieved as a result of the interaction of internal, regional, and international factors, foremost among which were the long Kurdish struggle and Kurdish political participation in the new constitutional process.
However, this path was not evidence of a fixed American commitment to the Kurdish issue. Subsequent developments, particularly in Syria, showed that Washington distinguishes between supporting a military partner it needs at a specific stage and long-term political commitment to its rights.
During the presidency of Donald Trump, relations with the Kurds in Syrian Kurdistan (Rojava) witnessed sharp shifts. Since 2025, the United States began reducing its military presence in Syria and handing over a number of its bases, until the withdrawal of its forces from the last major base, Qasrak base, was completed on April 16, 2026.
This came within the context of broader political and military transformations following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024, the rise of the transitional authority in Damascus led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, and the shifting of Washington’s priorities in dealing with the Syrian file.
American envoy Tom Barak had announced in January 2026 that the original purpose of the Syrian Democratic Forces, as the primary force on the ground in confronting the ISIS organization, had largely ended, calling on the Kurds to integrate into the new Syrian state.
Here the paradox becomes clear: the state that contributed to building the military alliance with the SDF and provided it with support in its war against ISIS did not turn this partnership into a clear political guarantee for the future of Kurdish rights in Syria.
This does not mean that American policy was the only factor in the course of events; internal Syrian developments, regional power balances, and Kurdish political disagreements are all factors that contributed to shaping the new reality. Yet Washington remained an influential party in guiding the course of settlement, and its position on the partnership with Kurds was one of the decisive elements in recent transformations.
Second: The Democrats – Military Support Without Political Guarantees
On the other hand, Democratic administrations often adopt rhetoric more focused on human rights and the protection of minorities, but this rhetoric has not necessarily translated into fixed political commitments toward the Kurdish issue.
During Bill Clinton’s era, American policy continued to contain Saddam Hussein’s regime while maintaining air protection arrangements in northern Iraq, but it did not move toward adopting an independent political project guaranteeing the Kurds the right to determine their future outside the framework of the Iraqi state.
During Barack Obama’s era, another paradox emerged with the rise of the ISIS organization in 2014. Washington found in the Peshmerga forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces an essential field partner in the war against the organization, providing them with military, intelligence, logistical, and air support.
When ISIS besieged the city of Kobani in 2014, the United States intervened militarily and provided decisive air support that contributed to changing the course of the battle and preventing the fall of the city. This was one of the most prominent testimonies to the importance of the Kurdish role in the war on terror.
Yet this support, despite its importance, did not turn into an American commitment to political recognition of the distinctiveness of Syrian Kurdistan or a guarantee of the form of its administration and constitutional future.
In Iraq as well, Washington officially remained committed to the unity of the Iraqi state and did not provide an independent international guarantee regarding the future of the Kurdistan Region outside the framework of the Iraqi constitution.
The two experiences proved that military support, even when decisive, does not automatically mean parallel political support. Washington was ready to cooperate with the Kurds when security necessity dictated it, but it remained cautious regarding the issue of committing to a political future that transcends the borders of existing states.
Hence, it is not correct to view the Democrats as a permanent guarantee, nor is it correct to consider the Republicans a permanent adversary. The most important criterion is the extent of any American administration’s readiness to turn its declared positions into sustainable political and legal commitments.
Third: Syrian Kurdistan (Rojava) – From Military Partnership to the Question of Political Destiny
The experience of Syrian Kurdistan (Rojava) presents one of the most prominent cases revealing the gap between military alliance and political recognition.
Following the rise of the ISIS organization in 2014, the United States found in the Syrian Democratic Forces an effective field partner in confronting the organization, especially since Washington was reluctant to fight a broad ground war with its direct forces.
The United States provided air, intelligence, armaments, and logistical support, while the SDF forces bore the brunt of ground confrontations and made heavy human sacrifices, alongside what was provided by the Peshmerga and other forces that participated in the war against the organization.
However, this partnership, throughout its years, did not produce a clear political agreement guaranteeing the national rights of the Kurdish people or determining the position of Syrian Kurdistan in the future of the Syrian state.
With the fall of Assad’s regime in December 2024, Syria entered a new political phase. American priorities gradually shifted as Washington tended to support the transitional authority in Damascus and encourage the integration of institutions and military forces within the framework of the new Syrian state.
In January 2026, confrontations escalated between Syrian government forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces, accompanied by political and military pressures that led to wide changes in the balances of control.
On January 30, 2026, an agreement was announced between Damascus and the SDF, including arrangements for the phased integration of forces and the formation of a military division of three brigades from the Syrian Democratic Forces, alongside other security and administrative arrangements. However, the agreement, and the developments that followed, opened fundamental questions regarding the nature of integration, guarantees of rights, the fate of institutions and local administration, and the extent of the Kurds’ ability to actively participate in shaping the future of their regions.
Here, three interrelated but non-identical files must be distinguished:
The first is the national, political, and cultural rights of the Kurdish people, which are rights that should not depend on the fate of any military formation or political administration.
The second is the future of the Autonomous Administration and its institutions, and whether it is possible to develop them within a constitutional formula ensuring decentralization, participation, and local specificity.
The third is the future of the Syrian Democratic Forces as a military force that emerged in the conditions of the war on ISIS and faces today the imperative of reorganizing its position within the structure of the Syrian state.
Conflating these files may lead to reducing the Kurdish question to the fate of the SDF, or treating the integration of forces as an automatic solution to the national and political problem. Meanwhile, the truth is that any settlement that does not guarantee the constitutional and political rights of the Kurdish people will remain an incomplete settlement, regardless of its military and administrative arrangements.
Experience has revealed that Washington can support a military partner for long years, but it does not necessarily provide guarantees for its political future. Therefore, the most important lesson from the Rojava experience is not the rejection of international alliances, but rather not building the future upon them alone.
Fourth: Iraqi Kurdistan Region – After the American Military Presence
The repercussions of American transformations were not limited to Syrian Kurdistan, but extended to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, which has remained an important ally for Washington in the region for decades.
Concern escalated in the region with the approach of September 30, 2026, the date set for ending the American military presence within the international coalition’s mission in Iraq.
The Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region, Masrour Barzani, warned in an interview with the Financial Times that the withdrawal of American forces amid regional tensions leaves the region more vulnerable to threats, considering that leaving allies without an adequate defense system would be shameful.
These fears stem from a clear security reality; the region does not possess an integrated and independent air defense system capable of facing various types of missile and drone threats in a region where Iranian, Turkish, Iraqi, and international interests intertwine.
This does not mean that the American presence was an absolute guarantee of the region’s security, but it constituted an element of balance and deterrence, and contributed to providing a security umbrella during sensitive phases.
The end of the American military presence raises a question that transcends the relationship with Washington: How can the Kurdistan Region protect its security and stability amid regional competition, security challenges, and internal political disputes?
This question does not concern the region alone, but carries a broader significance for all parts of Kurdistan; for reliance on external protection, without building cohesive political, security, and economic institutions, remains a source of permanent anxiety.
Fifth: The US Congress – Bipartisan Consensus Does Not Equal Permanent Guarantee
Amid these transformations, a striking political development emerged in the US Congress, represented by the introduction of the “Protecting Kurds” bill on January 29, 2026, initiated by Republican Senator Lindsey Graham with the participation of Democratic Senator Richard Blumenthal.
The bill came in the context of attacks to which the Syrian Democratic Forces were exposed and the concerns they raised regarding the fate of the Kurds in Syria.
The bill included punitive measures against Syrian officials and financial institutions, the redesignation of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as a foreign terrorist organization, conditioning congressional review on any termination of Syria’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, in addition to granting the president authorities to suspend sanctions according to conditions related to halting attacks on the Syrian Democratic Forces and their partners.
The introduction of the bill reflects the presence of influential voices within both the Republican and Democratic parties seeing the necessity of protecting the Kurds and linking this to American credibility toward partners who contributed to the war on ISIS.
However, it is necessary to distinguish between introducing a bill, passing it, and turning it into binding law. The bill, despite its political significance, does not in itself constitute a complete legal guarantee, nor does it mean that Congress has finalized its position definitively.
Its importance remains in revealing the existence of a political space in which the Kurdish issue can move, and that building relations with American legislative institutions should not be restricted to the executive administration or the White House.
Yet betting on a single bill, regardless of its title or the volume of support it enjoys, cannot be an alternative to an independent, long-term Kurdish strategy.
Sixth: Toward a New Strategy – From Tactical Ally to Securing Rights
Previous experiences reveal that the Kurdish question cannot build its future on the assumption of the existence of a permanently friendly American party. Republicans and Democrats, despite their differing rhetoric and methods, ultimately operate within the system of the American state’s interests and strategic priorities.
American interests intersected with Kurdish aspirations at important historical milestones, but they did not always turn into continuous political commitment. Hence, what is required is not withdrawing from international relations or turning one’s back on alliances, but rather dealing with them as tools to serve an independent political and rights project, not a substitute for it.
This strategy can be built on five basic pillars:
1. Securing Rights in the Syrian Constitution
The priority in Syrian Kurdistan (Rojava) is to guarantee constitutional recognition of the Kurdish people, their national, political, cultural, and linguistic rights, and to ensure their participation in state administration and its institutions.
These rights should not be subject to temporary bargaining, nor should they be linked to the fate of a military force or fleeting political balances.
2. Building a Unified and Legitimate Kurdish Political Representation
Foreign diplomacy cannot be influential unless it is based on a clear Kurdish political position and representative institutions that enjoy legitimacy and encompass parties, social forces, independents, women, and youth.
Pluralism is not a problem in itself, but the absence of coordination and a shared vision weakens the negotiation capacity and makes others more capable of exploiting internal disputes.
3. Internationalizing the Issue via Rights and Legal Pathways
There must be a transition from merely issuing statements and declarations to organized institutional work in the United Nations and international forums, documenting violations, pursuing legal files, and building sustainable relationships with human rights organizations, parliaments, and research centers.
Rights that enjoy legal documentation and international follow-up become more prominent in political discussions, even though international recognition alone does not dispense with internal consensus and constitutional guarantees.
4. Building an Independent and Balanced International Relations Network
It is essential to diversify relationships and not restrict them to Washington alone, through building political, cultural, and diplomatic bridges with European countries, international institutions, and influential powers in the region.
Investment should also be made in popular, cultural, and media diplomacy so that the Kurdish issue does not remain present in the world only when wars break out or security crises escalate.
5. Enhancing Self-Reliance
Self-reliance does not mean isolation or dispensing with alliances, but rather possessing the elements of political, economic, and social resilience.
This includes developing institutions, strengthening the economy, consolidating popular participation, building disciplined security capabilities within legal frameworks, and finding internal mechanisms to resolve disputes.
Whenever the Kurds possess more cohesive institutions and a more independent political decision, their ability to negotiate with international powers increases from the position of a partner, rather than the position of a party awaiting protection.
Conclusion: From Negotiating Paper to Constitutional Right
The victory of Republicans or Democrats may change the methods of American policy and its tactics, but it does not nullify the fact that strategic interests remain the primary determinant of Washington’s decisions.
The Kurds have made great sacrifices in confronting tyranny and terrorism, and have been on numerous occasions essential partners in protecting stability and facing threats that were not confined to their regions alone. Yet these sacrifices did not always translate into political guarantees commensurate with their scale.
The lesson to be drawn is not to reject allies, or to stop building international relations, but not to confuse alliance with destiny, military support with recognition of rights, and political statements with legal commitments.
The Kurdish question needs active international relations, but before that, it needs a unified political project, legitimate representative institutions, and a clear vision for the future of the Kurdish people in its various parts.
The ally may come when interests align, and may go when calculations change; as for the right, it should neither come by a decision from Washington, nor depart with the change of the White House’s occupant.
What the Kurds need today is not an unchanging ally—for this is not something international politics makes—but a political and rights project that makes their rights permanent, even when alliances change.
Note: This text is translated from the original Arabic version… Read the Arabic version:Click here
