By Ibrahim Kaban
Not all historical phases are primed for achieving major gains; there are moments when preserving what has already been accomplished becomes more critical than pursuing new goals. It appears that we, the Kurds in Syria, stand today before one of those pivotal moments, where political and regional shifts dictate a reconsideration of priorities, and a transition from the logic of managing influence to protecting gains and building more stable foundations for the future—even if this transition passes through dramatic shifts that often resemble the birth of hope in the midst of violent crises.
The first thing that must be acknowledged is that the current state of the Kurdish cause in Syria was not the result of external factors alone, despite the significance and impact of those factors. It is easy to blame Turkish policies, international shifts, or regional understandings, but that alone does not explain the scale of the retreat witnessed by the Kurdish experience in recent years. A large part of the problem stems from internal and objective factors related to the nature of the political and partisan structure that managed the past phase, engaging in crises and disputes characterized by ideological violence, which in turn created conflicting internal Kurdish paths in terms of substance and hopes.
Regional powers, foremost among them Turkey, have clearly worked to prevent the Kurdish presence in Syria from transforming into a stable political entity or a genuine partner in shaping the country’s future. However, the success of these policies would not have reached its current extent were it not for internal vulnerabilities that were skillfully exploited by adversaries. The Kurdish reality suffered from a clear state of political and organizational fragility, manifested in the multiplicity of projects and visions, and the absence of a political decision-making center capable of unifying Kurdish interests within a shared vision.
Over the past years, Kurdish political forces were preoccupied with power struggles more than they were with building an inclusive national project. Instead of translating military and administrative achievements into long-term political and constitutional gains, a large portion of Kurdish energy was consumed in partisan disputes and competition over legitimacy and representation. This was not limited to one party over another; rather, it included various forces that dealt with the Kurdish cause from a narrow partisan perspective rather than treating it as a national and ethnic cause requiring a long-term strategic vision.
Furthermore, the Kurds did not succeed in leveraging their international presence as required. Active participation in the war against terrorism, and the pivotal role played by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in defeating ISIS, could have formed a foundation for building more entrenched political gains. However, this opportunity was not sufficiently utilized to convert temporary international support into long-term political guarantees. Experience has proven once again that nations do not build their policies on emotion or gratitude, but on shifting interests, and that no people can protect their rights by relying on the outside world alone.
Among the dilemmas that contributed to weakening the Syrian Kurdish position is the alignment of parts of the Kurdish political movement with conflicts and axes that transcend the Syrian arena. The connection of certain Kurdish forces to various regional extensions has made Syrian Kurdish decision-making directly affected by developments in Turkey and the wider region. Instead of producing an independent Syrian political project arising from the specific reality of the Kurds within Syria, a part of the Kurdish scene has found itself paying the price for regional conflicts over whose paths or outcomes it possesses no control.
However, acknowledging these failures should not lead to despair or surrender, but rather to a courageous political review that rearranges priorities and establishes a new, more realistic phase. The primary challenge today does not lie in reclaiming what was lost all at once, but in preserving the remaining elements of strength and preventing their further erosion.
Hence arises the need to build a new political approach based on several fundamental pillars:
First: Shifting from the mentality of grand slogans to a mentality of realistic goals. Politics is not built on wishes, but on the balance of power and available opportunities. It may be wise at the current stage to focus on consolidating achievable political, cultural, and administrative rights, rather than entering into conflicts over objectives that exceed available capabilities.
Second: Rebuilding a shared Kurdish position. No matter the strength of any single party or political current, it will not be able to face the upcoming challenges alone. What is required is not a superficial, formal organizational unity, but a political consensus on the minimum threshold of shared national interests, and the creation of dialogue and coordination mechanisms capable of protecting Kurdish decision-making from the divisions that have weakened it throughout past years.
Third: Redefining the relationship with Damascus according to the logic of mutual interests. The Kurds are part of Syria, and their future will be within the Syrian state, regardless of the form of this state or the nature of its political regime. Therefore, what is required is negotiating to consolidate rights within the framework of the state, rather than entering into open confrontations that drain remaining capabilities, while simultaneously refusing to accept a return to previous policies of marginalization and exclusion.
Fourth: Shifting the center of gravity from the military sphere to the political and societal spheres. Military force may be a tool for protection, but it cannot alone build a sustainable project. Educational, economic, and cultural institutions, along with civil society organizations, are what guarantee the continuity of any political presence in the long term.
Fifth: Investing in the production of a new political elite that possesses the capacity for strategic thinking and crisis management. The upcoming phase will not be one of mobilization and slogans, but rather a phase of negotiation, managing balances, and building alliances—tasks that require different political mindsets than those that managed the early years of the conflict.
The most important lesson to be drawn from the past experience is that preserving gains is no less important than achieving them. The political history of peoples is measured not only by the achievements they attain, but by their ability to protect those achievements and transform them into sustainable realities. The current phase may be one of modest goals compared to previous ambitions, but it could simultaneously be the most critical phase, because it pertains to safeguarding the remaining tools of strength and preventing their total loss.
Saving what can be saved does not mean accepting defeat; rather, it means transitioning from a phase of emotional reaction to a phase of planning, and from a mentality of responsiveness to a mentality of future-building. Peoples are not defeated when they suffer setbacks, but when they fail to review their mistakes and reformulate their project to fit the new reality.
This is perhaps the most urgent task facing the Kurds in Syria today: not searching for a quick victory or temporary gains, but building a political project that is more realistic, independent, and capable of enduring in the face of upcoming transformations.
Note: This text is translated from the original Arabic version… Read the Arabic version: Click here
